Thesis: Constrained by low-rate procurement, the Marine Corps MV-22 fielding plan must effectively employ both the CH-46 and MV-22 to meet its medium lift assault support requirements during a fourteen-years transition period to ensure a rapid build-up of combat readiness and the innovative employment of this tiltrotor aircraft.
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We must hold our minds alert and receptive to the application of unglimpsed methods and weapons. The next war will be won in the future, not in the past. We must go on or go under.
- It appears the Marine Corps' perseverance for a significantly more capable medium lift replacement aircraft has finally paid off. However, the associated cost of this process is manifested in a prolonged transition plan complicated with the requirement of replacing a rapidly aging helicopter fleet while simultaneously establishing a solid foundation for tiltrotor support for the Fleet Marine Forces. The general argument presented here is that the Marine Corps' MV-22 fielding plan should effectively employ both the CH-46 and the MV-22 Osprey to meet the Marine Corps medium lift assault support requirements during a fourteen-year transition period. As obvious as this statement may appear, the urgent need for this replacement aircraft should not lead to the simple one for one replacement of the CH-46 that may be detrimental to the innovative employment of this new and different aircraft. The more specific argument of this paper is that given the current procurement rate of the MV-22, its early employment should be focused on building combat readiness and supporting the Marine Corps' warfighting requirements.
WHY THE MARINE CORPS NEEDS THE MV-22 OSPREY
Before we can begin to analyze the Marine Corps' medium lift assault support requirements, we must first understand why the Marine Corps needs the MV-22. In simple terms, two primary reasons stand out why it is necessary for the Marine Corps to procure such an aircraft. First, the Marine Corps is in dire need of a replacement aircraft for its current medium lift assault support fleet. Second, the Marine Corps needs the MV-22 to support its Operational Maneuver From the Sea concept for 21st century warfare.
We will first examine the more easily recognizable requirement for the MV-22 as a replacement aircraft for the Marine Corps' aging CH-46 and CH-53D helicopters.
Purchased as a short-term solution to cover helicopter shortfalls or losses for anticipated combat operations in Vietnam, the CH-46 essentially is a military version of the "off-the- Mobility assets that support the OMFTS concept place a heavy reliance on applying technology to provide significantly improved capabilities over current systems. The
Marine Corps' ability to maneuver and sustain forces from ships over the horizon to objectives deep within the littoral regions is very limited today. Procurement of the MV-22 and the advanced amphibious assault vehicle (AAAV) are essential for this capability.
Low rate fielding of required mobility assets will only delay the Marine Corps long-term strategic direction for the 21st century and a true OMFTS capability.
For the MV-22 fielding plan to be successful, it must first effectively replace the CH-46 and CH-53D helicopters and secondly support the Marine Corps' OMFTS concept for future warfighting. Cost constraints have produced a prolonged procurement plan that will require a thirteen-year transition for the Marine Corps medium lift aircraft. Given this prolonged procurement plan, what fielding plan will best support the Marine Corps' need for the MV-22 as these aircraft trickle into its inventory?
MV-22 SQUADRON TRANSITION PLAN
The single factor having the most influence on the MV-22 fielding plan is the procurement schedule for the MV-22 aircraft itself. Significant changes to the MV-22's procurement plan would drastically change its fielding plan. The longer the procurement plan, the more likely that plan may change in the future. The ability to plan a five-year budget is often challenging enough, now try it with a fifteen-year procurement plan for the MV-22. However, to effectively plan for the MV-22 transition, the assumption must be made that the procurement plan will remain as it exists today.
Since the first Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) contract, the procurement rate for Expected to reach its initial operational capability (IOC) during FY01, VMMT-204 will get the first twelve production MV-22s delivered to the Marine Corps. 19 The 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing has first priority in the MV-22 fielding plan. MCAS New River will essentially become the V-22 training hub with the FRS, training and aircraft support facilities, and the first four tactical fleet squadrons. The MV-22 transition process is built around the FRS. Based on the success of this process during the AV-8B transition, each MV-22 transitioning squadron will be trained as a unit at VMMT-204. In this process described as an "Amoeba", the majority of the transitioning squadrons' aircrew and maintenance personnel will be trained at one time before splitting off as a separate combat capable MV-22 squadron. 20 This "one schoolhouse" approach to training will centralize MV-22 expertise and focus on training squadrons, rather than individuals. It is anticipated that each squadron will take six months to complete this transition from start to finish. Eight months has been scheduled for the first squadron to allow some extra flexibility and provide additional training as time permits. 21 The importance of the FRS in any aircraft fielding plan can not be over emphasized. This early period of the MV-22 transition is identified by constant challenges. Once the FRS has become operational, it will immediately begin training the first tactical MV-22 squadron. However, as these tactical squadrons complete FRS training, they will be forced to operate with less than their authorized number of MV-22s while awaiting aircraft coming off the production line. As the FRS completes training of the first MV-22 squadron it will immediately begin training another. The committing of these tactical squadrons as a MEU(SOC) ACEs will require each squadron to solely focus on training for deployment rather than supporting the fleet. However, the burden of assuming the ACE responsibilities could be at the expense of Just as the early commitment to MEU(SOC) ACE responsibilities on the East Coast, the West Coast will be faced with the same challenges in preparation for deployment.
Depending on how soon these transitioning squadrons begin FRS training, the now higher MV-22 production rates could provide aircraft to the squadrons earlier in the deployment cycle. Again, the focus would still be on preparing for ACE responsibilities for a MEU(SOC) deployment, rather than support of the fleet.
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TRANSITIONING PERSPECTIVES
The process of fielding a new and completely different aircraft is an enormous task that can be accomplished in many different ways. Although this process has been completed many times in the past, each transition has its own complicated issues that must be addressed. In the case of the MV-22 fielding plan, the process is complicated by the extended delays in procuring a medium lift replacement aircraft, the low-rate of MV-22 procurement, and the employment of a completely new type of aircraft. Examining the MV-22 fielding plan as it exists today, raises three areas of concern. First, I question the CH-46s ability to continue operating past the 2010 timeframe. Secondly, I believe the earlier retirement of the CH-53D helicopters could save some money further down the road. Finally, I question the early deployment of the MV-22 squadrons as the ACE for a MEU(SOC) deployment.
CH-46s BEYOND 2010
The Marine Corps' CH-46 fleet is rapidly aging as it continuously tries to meet the Squadron key players, such as the Commanding Officer and the Operations Officer, will be attending numerous meetings and staff planning conferences that will pull them away from the squadron and take-up an inordinate amount of time. vision of warfare in the 21st century validates the requirements for tiltrotor capabilities in the concepts "Operational Maneuver From the Sea" and "Ship to Objective Maneuver."
The MV-22 plays a key role in the Marine Corps' ability to move forces from great distances and rapidly converge them at a decisive point on the future battlefield.
However, this capability is not going to happen overnight. Fleet Marine Force medium lift requirements will be supported by CH-46s and CH-53Ds for many years to come.
The Marine Corps is about to enter perhaps its most challenging phase of the acquisition and employment of the MV-22 Osprey: fleet introduction and transition.
Although this same process has been accomplished for many other aircraft in the past, the Marine Corps will be expanding its horizons both in interservice training and tiltrotor tactics. Crucial to an efficient and effective transition plan is the ability to constantly and Early transition years will need to be focused on building MV-22 expertise, while at the same time reconstituting the best of the CH-46 fleet to continue to support the Marine Corps for another ten years. Medium lift missions requirements will need to be filled based on capabilities requirements first, not priorities. The CH-46 should be employed wherever and whenever it meets mission requirements, allowing the MV-22 to be employed on steadily more demanding missions and continue building aircraft expertise.
The MV-22's efforts must be focused on enhancing the Marine Corps warfighting capabilities first. This may lead to temporary changes in the aircraft mix requirements in support of Marine Expeditionary Units, while MV-22 squadrons gain operational experience in the full spectrum of medium lift requirements.
